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CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS. By Glendon A. Schubert. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1960. Pp. xvi, 735. $8.50.
THE SUPREl\m COURT. By John R. Schmidhauser. New York: Holt,
Rhinehart and Winston, Inc. 1960. Pp. 163. $1.50.
THE .Al\mRICAN SoPREl\m COURT. By Robert G. McCloskey. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1960. Pp. x, 260. $5.
The United States Supreme Court, always a subject of great interest, has
stimulated an unusually large volume of literary effort during the recent
years. Attention has been directed, not only to the trends and movements
apparent in its decisions, but even more significantly to the Court's institutional position, to its composition and methods of operation, and to the
Court's understanding of its role in exercising the power of judicial review.
The controversies about the Court in recent years and the criticisms directed
against it, as well as defenses made on its behalf, have all contributed to
keep the Court in the public eye and to help generate the spate of books and
articles dealing with it.
Professor Schubert's hefty volume, subtitled "The Political Behavior of
Supreme Court Justices and the Constitutional Policies That They Make,"
combines a generous amount of text with a substantial body of case material
dealing with selected phases of the Court's adjudications on constitutional
issues. Professor Schmidhauser's small paperback volume which deals with
the Supreme Court's politics, parallels to some extent the discussion found
in Part I of Professor Schubert's book. The author deals with the question
of how men get to the Supreme Court and what considerations are taken
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into account in their appointment, supplies data on the social and political
background of the Justices, discusses the external pressures that operate on
the Court, and portrays the internal procedures and customs that help
shape the Court's freedom in the decision-making process. Professor McCloskey in his book subjects the Supreme Court and its power of judicial
review to critical evaluation. He supplies an overall picture of the Court's
exercise of its review power in the successive stages of our constitutional
history and in the concluding chapters deals critically with the whole problem of judicial review and the role that the Court should assume for itself.
Each of these books makes a useful contribution. Professor Schubert's
book is a book intended for class use and should be especially helpful in
the courses in constitutional law and constitutional history taught in
political science departments. Although the case material lacks the comprehensiveness and depth of treatment of particular subject matters often
found in constitutional law casebooks intended for college use, this
deficiency is at least in substantial part compensated for by the extensive
introductory notes and comments that the author himself supplies with
respect to the case material he has selected for this volume. It must be
remembered that Professor Schubert's thesis is that the Supreme Court is a
policy-making body and he divides the subject matter of his book, so far as
the case material is concerned, into a series of topics that are helpful in
developing his thesis. The cases on the whole are well chosen. This
reviewer found Part I of Professor Schubert's book to be its most interesting
feature and the part that adds the most distinctive value. Entitled "A
Behavioral Approach to the Supreme Court," it consists primarily of text
matter as well as excerpts quoted from other sources. One section deals with
such questions as the staffing of the Supreme Court, the background of the
Justices, the considerations that go into the nominations of Justices, the role
of the Senate, and the problem of judicial superannuation. The section
on the decision-making process in which the author discusses lobbyists before the Supreme Court is particularly interesting. He refers to the use of
test cases, propaganda in legal periodicals and the use of amici curiae as
elements of the lobbying process before the Court. Professor Schubert points
out that the NAACP, for instance, because of its participation in many cases
involving equal protection, has become one of the most influential lobbyists
before the Court. The author makes a point of the dangers involved in the
free use of the amicus curiae brief as a means of bringing pressure to bear on
the Court. The section concerning decision-making on the merits is a very
helpful and informative one for the student who has no idea of how the
Court goes about its business. Included here is a discussion of the way the
Chief Justice performs his important role in the assigning of opinions, the
place of the dissenting opinion, and the role of the law clerks in assisting
the Justices with their work. While much of this material is not new, it is
brought together here in a helpful way. The last section of Part I deals
with bloc behavior. Here the author describes the blocs that have appeared
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on the Court from time to time in recent years. Referring to the Court in
the middle thirties he uses the expression, the "Hughberts Game" to indicate the vital role played by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice
Roberts in determining which bloc governed on the Court at that time.
With respect to the substance of the Supreme Court's decisions, Professor
Schubert is concerned with setting them in a context that makes clear that
the Court exercises really a political power, in that judicial appraisal and
evaluation of basic policy factors plays a large role in the adjudication of
constitutional issues. In stressing this approach the author emphasizes what
is now generally recognized, namely, that constitutional decision-making
cannot be explained in terms of an objective and disinterested judicial interpretation of "the law" as captured in a text. But on the point raised
with respect to the Court's policy-making function, it should also be
observed that one of the important policy considerations which is the
source of division within the Court at present is how actively or passively the
Court should exercise its important power of judicial review at the expense
of legislative freedom to determine policy.
The author's own introductory notes and comments relating to the case
materials make interesting reading. Professor Schubert writes in a frank,
stimulating, and often pungent way. Some of his generalizations respecting
the decided cases reveal a superficial analysis. When he suggests, for instance, (p. 536) that the distinction between the Terminiello and the Feiner
cases1 is that in the former case the Court was concerned to protect a
fascist's right of speech, whereas in the latter case it was not concerned with
protecting a left-winger's right of free speech, he states a surface conclusion
that ignores some vital points of difference benv-een the two cases. In
Terminiello the defendant was speaking in a private auditorium to a
favorable audience, whereas in Feiner the police intervened in the situation
where the defendant was speaking in the street to a hostile audience. To
gloss over and disregard these factual elements that enter into the pragmatic
judgment process and to rationalize the results in terms of the Court's
predilection for one type of speech over another suggests the risk of employing "judicial predilectionism" as the central canon for interpreting the
Supreme Court's decisions. In some of his comments, the author occasionally
resorts to a bit of flippant humor as when, in dealing with the Breithaupt
case2 and viewing it by reference to the earlier Rochin case,s the author
suggests (p. 680) that the lesson police may learn is that they should beat a
prisoner into a state of unconsciousness before using a stomach pump to
extract incriminatory materials from his body.
The minor criticisms noted above should not serve to obscure the many
good qualities of Professor Schubert's scholarly and well-written book and

l
2
8

Tenniniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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the useful insights he contributes in interpreting the behavior role of the
tribunal which occupies a key role in our governmental power structure.
Professor Schmidhauser's modest volume is for the most part a descriptive study of the Supreme Court. The book does not purport to deal
critically with the Court or with the power of judicial review. He deals in
the first part with what he calls "the realities of judicial selection." Interesting information is tabulated and presented in regard to such factors as
age, education, occupation, religion, prior judicial experience, and the
general political and racial background of the men who have been appointed to the Supreme Court. The author makes the point that it was
probably intended at the very creation of the Constitution, in giving the
President the power to appoint the members of the Supreme Court, that
political considerations would play a dominant role in these appointments,
and he concludes on the basis of his study that in fact this has been the case.
Of course, this has not been invariably true, as Professor Schmidhauser
points out, but he does present a fairly good case to document his assertion
that, in general, appointments have been "political" in the large sense that
the President was concerned with the judge's basic ideology in respect to
political, economic and social matters. But history also demonstrates that
judges when faced with the responsibilities of their position often evince
a judicial philosophy and follow a course of action that prove surprising
to the appointing authority.
The author is concerned with proposals and movements in force, particularly those initiated by the American Bar Association, for securing nonpartisan appointment of judges. The author fears that if the Bar Association is to play any part in the appointment process, this will become a
vehicle for limiting Supreme Court appointments to men whose political
and economic predispositions are agreeable to the organized bar. In the
part of the book dealing with external forces operating upon the Court,
the author speaks of lawyers, judges, and their professional associations and
their impact upon the Supreme Court. He spends some pages examining and
criticizing the role of the American Bar Association in its attempt to
influence the Supreme Court. Attention is also given to the Conference of
State Chief Justices which in 1958 issued a statement critical of the Court.
This reviewer feels that Professor Schmidhauser in developing this phase of
the subject, whatever the merits of his views, has seized upon what appears
to be one of the less influential of the external pressures operating on the
Court. Professor Schmidhauser concedes (p. 92) that the American Bar
Association's criticisms and proposals and the Statement by the Conference
of State Chief Justices have not up to this point had any perceptible effect
upon the Supreme Court. Indeed, if one is to discuss the external forces
operating on the Supreme Court, it would be much more useful to speak
of the professional lobbyists that Professor Schubert refers to in Part I of
his book, namely, the various organizations that appear so frequently before
the Court either to argue cases ostensibly instituted by private parties or to
submit briefs as amici curiae. These organizations have a more direct access
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to the Court and it is fair to suggest they are more influential than outside
organizations like the American Bar Association. Moreover, the greatest
single force operating by way of an external restraint on the Supreme Court
is one which Professor Schmidhauser disregards and that is the force of
public opinion as reflected both in the press and as in Congress. History
makes clear that the Court over a period of time does conform to dominant
forces of public opinion and that sensitivity to congressional criticism and
reaction plays its part.
In the third part of his study the author portrays in an illuminating
way the evolution of the Supreme Court's internal procedures and customs.
Emphasis is placed upon Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's influence in develop•
ing procedures and customs designed to secure institutional unity and which
continued operative for a long time. In the chapter entitled "A Contempo•
rary Appraisal of Procedures and Customs," the author devotes some pages
to the Court's certiorari policy, the hearing stage, the conference stage and
the assignment of cases, and the preparation of opinion. He points out
that while the internal tradition in Marshall's day favored judicial unity,
the present trend is in favor of the ·writing of multiple opinions and the
free expression of divergent judicial viewpoints. This trend, in his opinion,
is attributable to the congressional grant of discretionary review authority,
with the result that the Court decides only the more difficult cases, and to
the impact of a liberal legal philosophy that favors the individual freedom
and responsibility of the judges and stresses the value that stems from the
competitive clash of ideas.
In a short concluding chapter, the author lists three categories of Supreme Court judges - the great judges, the judges with more than average
ability and legal training who conscientiously fulfilled their duties with
rigor and high intelligence, and the mediocre judges. What, according to
the author, determines greatness on the high bench? "In the context of the
particular requirements of service on the Supreme Court, the attainment
of greatness has usually been based upon a combination of personal qualities
such as political sagacity (frequently called judicial statesmanship), high
intellectual ability (but not necessarily philosophic training or detach•
ment), and a flair for literary accomplishment." (p. 154)
Professor Schmidhauser's highly informative and instructive book makes
good and inexpensive reading for anyone interested in learning more about
the judges and the way in which they carry on their work.
Professor Schubert's and Professor Schmidhauser's books are particularly
instructive in portraying the way the Court works and the factors that contribute to influence decision-making. Professor McCloskey's book, on the
other hand, is directed to an understanding and evaluation of the Supreme
Court's role in our constitutional system. Placing the problem in historical
perspective, he portrays the emergence of the Court's power and the significance of judicial review as the Court in successive stages of our national
history placed the weight of its power behind values currently dominant
in American life.
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The second to last chapter presents a critical examination of the Court's
present attempt to find a role for itself in the protection of civil liberties.
It furnishes an excellent, concise statement and critique of the Court's work
in the years since the judicial revolution of the 1930's when the Court
abandoned its role of furnishing constitutional protection for a laissez-faire
economics.
It is the book's last chapter, however, in which Professor McCloskey
discusses the basic problems of judicial review in a democratic society, that
the reviewer found most interesting and stimulating. The author's basic
concern is with the question of how actively the Court should assert its
power at the expense of legislative policy. Dealing with this problem in
the context of the Court's present concern with civil liberties, the author
finds that the resolution of this question is not easy. Should the Court stoutly
maintain freedom of speech and press by broad and bold strokes that rest
on absolute interpretations and result in frustration of legislative policy
based on dominant moods of the day? Or should it adopt a passive attitude
that allows virtually no room for judicial review? Professor McCloskey admits that it takes extraordinary ability and intelligence for the Court to
pursue a path whereby, on the one hand, it will avoid the excesses of power
that characterized the Court's performances in past years and, on the other
hand, do justice to its role as a protector of constitutional liberties. Professor McCloskey, like others who have dealt with this problem, proposes no
formula or solution in answer to this basic question, although he seems
generally to lean in favor of the degree of judicial self-restraint that recognizes a proper place for the play of dominant political forces, since he feels
that the Court can neither lag far behind nor forge far ahead of the main
currents of public sentiment. In saying this he does not mean to minimize
the Court's peculiar responsibility under our system for taking the longer
view than that customarily expected of the legislative branch. The author
wisely observes that "the Court's greatest successes have been achieved when
it has operated near the margins rather than in the center of political controversy, when it has nudged and gently tugged the nation, instead of trying
to rule it." (p. 229) The judicial policy that practices self-restraint while
at the same time laying stress on the long-run view calls for rather extraordinary talents of character and intelligence. "It requires judges who can
practice the arts of discrimination without losing the light of reason and
getting lost in a welter of ad hoc, pragmatic judgments." (p. 230)
Professor McCloskey's perceptive and penetrating study of the Court's
role in exercising its power of judicial review sheds light and tenders good
counsel in an area too often obscured by the heat and passion of controversy.
This excellent book deserves wide reading.

Paul G. Kauper,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

